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I. INTRODUCTION
1

Lindahl’s new book is erudite, detailed, comprehensive, and long.
Almost every page contains a new bit of information, a new argument, and
the materials, theories and doctrines on which Lindahl draws are almost
comprehensive. It is remarkable, therefore, that in a book dedicated in no
small part to conflicts between legal orders, Lindahl explicitly rejects the
relevance of that field of law that deals with such conflicts: namely private
international law. He juxtaposes private international law with other
techniques of boundary-setting that he does find relevant:
This set of techniques [margin of appreciation, subsidiarity, reciprocal
recognition, limited autonomy regimes, safe harbor agreements, the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments] is by no means
exhaustive, but its elements share a common denominator: they are
institutional arrangements designed to frame encounters between
collective self and other in ways that attempt to preserve both collective
identity and difference. On the face of it, they are vehicles for an
authoritative politics of boundaries arising from conflict between legal
Copyright © 2019 Ralf Michaels
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orders. This feature differentiates them from traditional conflict of law
rules, which generally are oriented to helping courts establish which of
two or more competing legal orders should determine a dispute as to the
applicable law and the jurisdiction for the case at hand. While there is
nothing ‘mechanical’ about the application of traditional conflict of law
rules, and while these rules certainly play an important role in a globalising
context, they contribute little to an enquiry into the give and take deployed
by an authoritative politics of boundaries in a global context.2

Why is private international law not considered as part of these techniques?
Lindahl’s view of conflict of laws mirrors that of many other critics; he
mentions “its extraordinarily complex and uncertain jurisdictional rules”3
and suggests early in the book that “conflict of laws is a reductive approach
to the problem of conflict.”4 Conflict-of-laws rules are, for him, “generally
[] oriented to helping courts establish which of two or more competing legal
orders should determine a dispute as to the applicable law and the jurisdiction
for the case at hand” and thus are not “vehicles for an authoritative politics
of boundaries arising from conflict between legal orders.”5
I think Lindahl has an erroneous concept of private international law (or
conflict of laws), as I will explain. But I think his omission of that field of
law is not accidental. There is a reason, I think, for why Lindahl excludes
conflict-of-laws rules from his analysis. It is indeed correct that private
international law does not fit easily in his current theory: Lindahl’s theory is
a political theory of unilateral self-assertion and restraint; private
international law, by contrast, is a technical doctrine of bilateral
determination of the applicable law. But the distinction between politics and
technicity itself is problematic, as I demonstrate later, and private
international law provides elements that can benefit Lindahl’s theory. In
particular, the bilateralism of private international law is a helpful tool to
overcome a solipsism that mars his theory. And the technical character
becomes a promising response to the problems of a purely agonistic politics.
In order to demonstrate this, I develop my argument in three stages. In
the next section (II) I summarize Lindahl’s own conception of asymmetry,
recognition, and ethical implications. I then demonstrate, in section III, how
all these aspects can be found also in the conflict of laws. In the following
section, I demonstrate two ways in which conflict of laws is actually more
than what Lindahl argues. This enables me, in section V, to run the argument
a third time, this time including a conflict-of-laws approach within Lindahl’s

2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 350.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 350.
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concept. In section VI, I point out an aspect that the conflict-of-laws
approach cannot capture, namely the aspect of power.
II. LINDAHL’S THEORY OF COLLECTIVE SELF-RESTRAINT:
DUAL ASYMMETRY AND RECOGNITION
Lindahl’s argument is complex and long, but I think a core thesis can
be formulated in a simple way without being too misleading: all legal orders
necessarily exclude.6 Legal orders have limits—although they can change
and develop, there is a limit to how far they can do so—and they therefore
have not only boundaries—that which they do not currently regulate—but
also fault lines—that which they could not even regulate. Boundaries are
determined in part in response to the collective’s inside, and in part in
response to demands from the outside, which force a legal order to define,
and redefine, its own boundaries. In this sense, legal orders exercise what
Lindahl calls “restrained collective self-assertion.”
Such restraint has always appeared obvious for state law: the law of
states is territorial and therefore, it appears, limited to what happens with the
state’s territory: what lies outside it is excluded. It is less clear, however, for
legal orders that we think of as global and therefore universal: human rights
law, world trade law, etc. We may be tempted to think that a deterritorialized
law, a law that covers the entire territory, could indeed be universal and nonexclusive. Lindahl shows, empirically, that this is not true for existing legal
orders (of which he discusses a good number). And he shows, theoretically,
that it is not, in fact, possible. Legal orders have a point, which means: they
are necessarily about something. This means that there is something that they
necessarily are not about, that stands outside of them. The point of a legal
order—what it is about—may change over time; what it is not about now
may be something that it will be about later. But there are limits to this
malleability, and these limits are not contingent. A legal order that could
potentially be about anything at all is therefore not actually about anything;
it is not a legal order. Legal orders, therefore, have boundaries; in order to
have an inside, they must have an outside.
The consequence is that there is an outside for every legal order, and an
ensuing relation between a legal order and its outside. This relation is, for
Lindahl, an asymmetric one.7 Lindahl’s main example, which runs through
the book, is that of the relation between the WTO on the one hand and the
KRRS, an Indian farmers’ movement, on the other. The WTO is not
6. For earlier variations of this thesis, see Hans Lindahl, A-Legality: Postnationalism and the
Question of Legal Borders, 73 MOD. L. REV. 30 (2010); HANS LINDAHL, FAULT LINES OF
GLOBALIZATION: LEGAL ORDER AND THE POLITICS OF A-LEGALITY (2013).
7. LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 278.
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universal and the KRRS stands on its outside. The asymmetry between both
that Lindahl focuses on is not, interestingly, one of power between a giant
organization on the one hand and a small NGO that opposes it. .Instead, the
asymmetry exists between inside and outside. And although Lindahl’s
sympathy with the little guy is palpable throughout the book, the perspective
he adopts is the inside perspective of the powerful actor among the two,
namely the WTO
From the WTO's own perspective, the asymmetry has two aspects,
which Lindahl calls asymmetry 1 and asymmetry 2. Asymmetry 1 is, for him,
“the asymmetry of a demand for recognition that is prior to the response of
the collective to that demand.”8 The KRRS’ demand for recognition is
surprising for the WTO because, so I understand it, it does not fit into its
existing pattern of legality and illegality. The KRRS does not (or at least not
only) ask the WTO to play by its own rules. Instead, the KRRS proposes an
alternative set of rules for the WTO and asks the WTO to adapt its rules to
those proposed by the KRRS. The collective—the WTO—can and must
respond to this demand for recognition.
This response is what is explained as asymmetry 2, and it is, essentially,
the asymmetry between the one who gives the response and the one who
receives it. Asymmetry 2 has three aspects. The first is normative: “the whole
point of collective closure is to prefer inside to outside.”9 The WTO, due to
its own conception (its “point”), prefers its own free-trade regime to the
KRRS challenge for local protections.10 The second aspect is institutional:
“the prerogative claimed by authorities to unilaterally close down a dialogue
about boundaries if they deem demands for recognition to be out of
bounds.”11 The collective, in other words, remains in charge. The third
aspect, finally, goes to identity: it concerns the authority’s ability to remain
indifferent to the demand. The authority may respond to the demand by
amending its own point, but it will not do so indefinitely: to some extent, the
claim will remain unanswered.
This dual asymmetry—a demand that is prior to a response, a response
that retains superiority over the demand—is crucial for Lindahl’s theory.
Without asymmetry, he suggests, we would fall back on a universalism that
would necessarily be false. The asymmetry expresses, ultimately, the fact
that an authority treats those belonging to the collective differently from
those who do not.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 281.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 297−98.
Id. at 280.
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Lindahl’s main opponent here is a theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity—
of rights and duties, of recognition—is definitional, for him, for relations
within a collective: it “is built into the very notion of joint action.”12 This
means that in the absence of joint action—across the boundaries of the
collective—reciprocity must be ruled out. And indeed, Lindahl argues in this
way when he rejects communitarianism as having to presume a prior
essentialized cultural identity, Rawlsian conceptions of justice as having to
presume a prior essentialized polity, and Habermasian universalism as
having to presume a (real or hypothetical) all-encompassing collective.13
If universalism is avoided through asymmetry, the opposite evil,
namely relativism, is avoided through a legal order’s relatedness with its
outside, and its response to the latter’s demand for recognition. How does a
legal order deal with demands for recognition? Lindahl distinguishes two
techniques: reciprocal and asymmetric recognition. Reciprocal recognition
is, for him, equivalent to universalism, and therefore to be rejected: through
mutual recognition, we recognize each other as members of the same
collectivity. This, he suggests, is inadequate to the understanding of the
inside/outside relation inherent in his concept. When the KRRS demands
recognition from the WTO, Lindahl suggests, it does not merely demand
inclusion.14 It does not merely ask the WTO to comply with its own rules; it
challenges these rules themselves, in the awareness that such challenges can
only be accommodated up to a point. On the other hand, when the WTO
deals with the demands by the KRRS, it does not need to recognize the
KRRS and its demands by including them. The WTO can change its own
point, but it need not, and indeed often will not, include the KRRS through
recognition.
Lindahl’s alternative is asymmetric recognition, which he defines as
“the core of a politics of boundary-setting that is authoritative by dint of
recognising the other (in ourselves) as one of us and as other than us.”15 This
combines, and thereby transcends, elements of both universalism
(recognition as one of us) and relativism (recognition as other than us):16
“The former aspect of asymmetrical recognition speaks to collective selfassertion; the latter, to collective self-restraint. A theory of asymmetrical
recognition interprets an authoritative politics of boundary-setting as
restrained collective self-assertion.”17 Recognition of the other appears, in a
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

LINDAHL, FAULT LINES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 6, at 228.
Id. at 228−34.
LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 279−80.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 335−36.
Id. at 327 (emphasis removed)
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dialectic way as “recognition of the other (in ourselves)” The other is thus
integrated into the collective, but its otherness is not denied.
III. A PRIVATE-INTERNATIONAL-LAW RECONSTRUCTION
This theory is not anathema to private international law. It can in fact
be reconstructed on the basis of private international law. Such a
reconstruction will prove fruitful (in the next section) because it helps to add,
from private international law, elements that can help Lindahl’s theory.
Private international law is, broadly understood, the legal discipline that
deals with situations that have connections to more than one legal order.
Private international law, at least in its narrow sense, does not lay out
substantive rules for such situations, but merely resolves conflicts between
the legal orders themselves. Typically, we distinguish three subdisciplines of
private international law. Jurisdiction determines the extent to which a state’s
courts have the competence to regulate transboundary cases; in a broader
sense, jurisdiction also concerns the territorial limits up to which a state can
legislate. Choice of law determines the question which law is applied—
especially between the forum’s own law (lex fori) and another state’s law
(lex causae). The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, finally,
deals with the question of giving domestic force to judicial decisions of
foreign States.
Lindahl allows for some space to two of these subdisciplines. He
considers the recognition of foreign judgments as relevant (presumably
because it appears to fit in his model of recognition), though he does not
discuss it in detail.18 Likewise, jurisdiction, which he defines as “the legal
manifestation of collective self-assertion: we* can regulate ourselves … .”19
Choice of law, by contrast, is absent from his analysis. The reason may be
that the discipline is too static for him:
“while conflict can be presented as a conflict between legal norms, we
should not forget that it is never only – and in any case never primarily –
a conflict between norms within a legal system nor between legal systems.
As the KRRS’ interference with the realisation of the WTO’s point makes
clear, conflict is conflict between (emergent) pragmatic orders, that is,
conflict about different ways of ordering who ought to do what, where and
when.20

This is apt insofar as private international law does take legal orders as given;
it does not conceptualize a dialogue or even a compromise through which

18. Id. at 350 n.2.
19. Id. at 314.
20. Id. at 73.
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the respective legal orders would alter their content.21 But this technical
character should not conceal that private international law is, contrary to
what Lindahl suggests, a vehicle of boundary-setting. Indeed, private
international law expressly adopts Lindahl’s idea of “restrained collective
self-assertion,” as two examples should make clear. A first example can be
found in a 1953 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Lauritzen v. Larsen,
clarifying a term of the Jones Act pertaining to compensation for “any
seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment.”
The question was whether the words “any seaman” included a Danish sailor
who had been hired in the United States and injured on a Danish ship in
Cuban waters. A literal interpretation of the term would have suggested that
the answer must clearly be yes: the words “any seaman” clearly seem to
suggest a semantic universalist aspiration. The U.S. Supreme Court did not
take this avenue. Instead, the Court followed a doctrine in U.S. law called
the presumption against extraterritoriality. According to this doctrine, the
legislator is presumed to legislate only with domestic interests in mind, and
so absent a clearly different legislative intent, a statute will not be read so as
to cover extraterritorial issues. We find, therefore, a deliberate selfconstraint.22
A second example concerns a method of conflict of laws called interest
analysis and developed especially by Brainerd Currie—effectively an
extreme form of what Lindahl would likely call relativism. A Court will,
according to the theory, always apply its own domestic law whenever its own
legislator has an interest in this application. This can lead to conflicts with
the laws of other interested states, and the application of the forum’s own
law can seem unwarranted where the forum’s own interest is slight and the
other state’s interest is clearly greater. Michael Traynor, a judge in California
(and friend of Currie) proposed, in order to deal with such cases, that the
judge should reassess the forum’s own interest with what he called “restraint
and moderation,” an idea that resembles Lindahl’s concept of ‘restrained
collective self-assertion’ even in terminology.23 The idea was accepted not
only by Currie but also by the courts.24
Private international law today, just like Lindahl’s own theory, is
neither universalist nor relativist. This was not always so. An older
conception of private international law was universalist: it attempted to
21. See Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, From Multiculturalism to Technique:
Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589, 648 (2012).
22. The parallel is not perfect. According to U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, the self-restraint
occurs even absent a concrete demand from a foreign legal order.
23. Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 59
CAL. L. REV. 845 (1961).
24. Brainerd Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1 (1963).
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derive rules on applicable law from public international law, with binding
force for all states. Another conception was relativist: it essentially left to
each legal order to determine the scope of its laws as a quality of these laws
themselves, with no regard for interaction with other legal systems. Both
approaches have been overcome in the name of what is sometimes called a
“third school of private international law.”25 In this school, private
international law remains situated within domestic law: each state has its
own private international law rules. But these private international law rules
are separate from the state’s own domestic rules, and they are formed,
specifically, with a view to the international situation.
As a consequence, private international law encompasses an asymmetry
between inside and outside like the one Lindahl conceptualizes. And it is
compatible with his two types of asymmetry. Asymmetry 1 described the
demand for recognition, which triggers a response from a legal order. In
private international law, this can be a concrete judicial decision given by
another legal order, for which recognition is sought. It can also be a foreign
law that is, potentially, applicable. Some theorists of private international
law indeed explain this latter situation also as one of a demand for
recognition: the foreign law, it is said, “wants” to be applied; the foreign
government has a (“governmental”) interest in its application. Others suggest
that the foreign legal order’s own “wants” are irrelevant. In each case,
however, a situation with multistate connections raises a potential of an
applicable foreign law that is, in Lindahl’s sense, prior to the legal order’s
response.
Thus for asymmetry 1. What about asymmetry 2? Recall that it has three
aspects: a normative one, an institutional one, and one of identity. The
normative preference of the inside over the outside easily translates into
private international law, where domestic law is normatively preferred over
foreign law. For traditional interest analysis, as we have seen, this is the end
of the analysis: where domestic law demands application, it is applied even
in face of a foreign governmental interest. Most others, however, do not
decide so automatically. “We are not so provincial as to say that every
solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home,”
as Justice Cardozo once famously formulated.26 Instead of a simple
prioritization of domestic over foreign law, a complicated technical analysis
determines which of the different laws is applied.
Second, the institutional aspect of asymmetry 2 is also present in private
international law. Because private international law is domestic law, it is up
25. See Ralf Michaels, Beyond Universalism and Particularism in International Law—Insights
from Comparative Law and Private International Law, B.U. L. REV. ONLINE 18 (2019).
26. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918).
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to each domestic legal order to draw boundaries, to decide how to deal with
the demand from the foreign legal order. Each legal order has its own private
international law, and its conflicts with foreign legal orders are decided by
its own courts and judges.
Thirdly, a legal order can decide to remain indifferent vis-à-vis the
foreign demand, says Lindahl. This is the case also in private international
law, although indifference suggests a lack of interest that is not really
mirrored. The public policy exception, a tool available in every conflict-oflaws system anywhere, allows a legal order to ignore a foreign law, or a
foreign court judgment, if to do otherwise would run counter to the legal
order’s own strongly held convictions—its core policies and conceptions of
justice. We have here, in a doctrinal form, nothing less than Lindahl’s fault
lines—the limits of a legal order’s ability to adapt to foreign demands.
Asymmetry is thus maintained in private international law. A legal
order decides how to deal with foreign legal orders on its own terms, in
response to demands from other legal orders, but is not bound to follow those
demands. Reciprocity is thus not necessary, nor is the assumption of an
overarching universal system of law. How does private international law deal
with demands for recognition?
To some extent, recognition is a part of private international law too:
private international law recognizes foreign court decisions, and its
willingness to apply foreign law presumes a recognition of the foreign law
as valid. Lindahl rightly distinguishes recognition within one legal system
from recognition between legal systems.27 There is a type of recognition that
happens within one collective. This is the recognition that much of political
philosophy has in mind (e.g. Nancy Fraser’s work). And it is also what
underlies, for example, H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition, which establishes
a legal relation between a population and a group of officials in charge of
making and administering laws. But that is not the only type of recognition.
In addition to such internal recognition, there can also be an external
recognition—the recognition of others as others.28 The KRRS’ demand for
recognition, Lindahl rightly remarks, is not merely a demand for inclusion
within the WTO. The same is true in private international law: a foreign legal
order’s demand for recognition is not a demand for inclusion; it is a demand

27. LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 274. I think the distinction Lindahl draws between recognition of
individuals and recognition of legal orders is derivative of the more fundamental distinction between
recognition within one legal system and recognition between legal systems.
28. For these two types of recognition, see Ralf Michaels, Law and Recognition—Towards a
Relational Concept of Law, in IN PURSUIT OF PLURALIST JURISPRUDENCE 90 (Nicole Roughan & Andrew
Halpin eds., 2017).
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for recognition or application in the specific case. Such a recognition is not
necessarily reciprocal.
Lindahl’s very question—whether a demand for recognition is a
demand for inclusion—finds its close parallel in private international law
discussions. In the area of the recognition of foreign judgments, an old
doctrine required that foreign judgments be turned into domestic judgments
before they can be applied. A similar discussion exists in choice of law.
According to the “local law theory,” which was once prevalent especially in
the United States and in Italy, a court never actually applies foreign law.
What the court does instead, in response to a foreign law’s demand for
recognition that the court deems justified, is to develop, ad hoc, a rule of
domestic law that mirrors the foreign law.29 The foreign law is, therefore,
included in the domestic legal order.
But, notably, such processes of domestication are no longer prominent.
In the area of judgment recognition, it is no longer thought necessary to
domesticate the foreign judgment. The recognition of a foreign judgment is
indeed a process that is necessary for its enforcement. But the recognition
does not make the foreign judgment a domestic judgment. All it does is
enable its enforcement, despite its foreignness. Similarly, the local law
theory has been discarded.30 The private international law response to a
foreign demand for recognition is not to change its own law.31 It is, instead,
the application of foreign law.
IV. THE ADDED VALUE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FOREIGN LAW AND TECHNIQUE
The latter points have, I hope, already begun to demonstrate something
that has, so far, been somewhat hidden. So far, I have suggested that, contrary
to what Lindahl suggests in his book,32 private international law is one of the
“vehicles for an authoritative politics of boundaries arising from conflict
between legal orders.” Insofar as private international law does draw a legal
order’s borders, it is in accordance with the other techniques that Lindahl
discusses.33 This border-drawing is, however, only one function of private
international law. Private international law has a second function, which
29. For the United States, see David Cavers, The Two “Local Law” Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV.
822 (1950).
30. Id.; Hessel Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 297,
316−17 (1953).
31. That would, instead, be Teubner’s theory of legal irritants, which is not related to private
international law. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
32. LINDAHL, supra note 2, at 350.
33. Id. at 349−50.

MICHAELS(DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

4/22/2019 6:40 PM

A SYMMETRY OF ASYMMETRIES?

415

none of the other vehicles have: namely to create a space for foreign law as
foreign law. Private international law not only limits the space of application
of a forum’s own law. It also opens up space for the application of foreign
law in the forum. It can lead not only to the nonapplication of the law of the
forum (what Lindahl calls collective self-restraint), but also to the
application of foreign law.
This process is central to private international law and yet remains the
aspect most widely misunderstood outside of the discipline. Indeed, it is a
process more complex and seemingly paradoxical than most others in the
law. For, in the process, foreign law does not lose its character as other
through the process of application. It remains foreign law, and yet it becomes
applicable. The local law theory, discussed above, is an example of a theory
that was developed in response to this complexity and paradoxical
character—but precisely because it ignored the paradoxical character
inherent in the process, it has been discarded.
It should be obvious that Lindahl’s own theorization of the paradoxical
relation between self and others could actually be made fruitful. Lindahl
conceptualizes the relation as a dialectic, the “recognition of the other (in
ourselves).” This comes close, I think, to the process of application of foreign
law: the foreign law is enforced in ourselves, but it does not thereby lose its
foreign character. The application of foreign law is a dialectical process, one
that operationalizes the difference between self and other, without resolving
it. It fits Sally Merry’s description of “the dialectic between legal systems,
each of which both constitutes and reconstitutes the other in some way.”34
Think back to Lindahl’s asymmetry 1—the idea that the Other’s
demand for recognition comes “too early,” predating the legal system’s own
self-definition. One is reminded here of Levinas’ writings on the Face: The
Other, through his mere existence and presence (the concrete presence of the
face), puts an ethical demand on us that is prior to ontology. Indeed, although
Lindahl does not draw on Levinas except once in a different context, he does
channel Bernhard Waldenfels, who in turn relies to no small extent on
Levinas.35 Levinas’ and Waldenfels’ point is, as far as I understand it, that
the Self has to respond to the demand of the Other—it can reject it or accept
it, but it cannot ignore it. Waldenfels calls this responsivity, and this
responsivity has, I suggest, a place also in private international law. The ethic
of private international law is not confined to tolerance or recognition. It is
responsivity, taking foreign law (the Other) seriously as foreign law, by

34. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 889 (1988).
35. See Bernhard Waldenfels, Levinas and the face of the other, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO LEVINAS (Simon Critchley & Robert Bernasconi eds., 2011).
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engaging with it in its concreteness.36 But this means more than asymmetric
recognition and principled willingness to respond internally, the responses
that Lindahl discusses. It also means a principled willingness to actually offer
hospitality, by applying the foreign law.37 This aspect, I argue, should make
private international law especially attractive to Lindahl’s own legal
philosophy. The other instruments that he lists do part of the job he is
interested in—namely, to draw and define a legal order’s boundaries in view
of challenges from the outside. But they do not adequately represent what he
is really interested in, namely the paradoxical relation between a collective
and its environment, between a legal order and a challenger.
Lindahl, as was discussed earlier, rejects private international law
because he feels that the discipline’s technical character that makes it
inadequate for his own essentially political project. This type of critique of
private international law—as overly technical, and therefore inadequate to
resolve conflicts that are actually political—is widespread. But it rests, I
think, on a double error.
The first error is to view the discipline’s technical character as a
shortcoming, instead of a quality. It is true that private international law is
very technical, and sometimes scholars and judges can, in applying private
international law, get lost in its technicalities. But the huge benefit of this
technicity is that it enables private international law to resolve problems that
would otherwise be unsolvable.38 Lindahl rightly emphasizes that the
problem of relations between legal orders is a particularly difficult one,
because it must be resolved without resort to a higher legal order within
which the difference is transcended. Where such a higher order cannot be
established, the only resort seems to be to a politics of conflict, as Nico
Krisch has suggested in his book on constitutional pluralism, and as Lindahl
suggests in his theory of a-legality and political agonism.39 Indeed, for
Lindahl, the demand for recognition creates the politically dynamic element
for a legal order—the one that challenges the existing distinction between

36. Ralf Michaels, Private International Law as an Ethic of Responsivity, in DIVERSITY AND
INTEGRATION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Maria Blanca Noodt Taquela & Veronica Ruiz AbouNigm eds, Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming).
37. On hospitality in this context, see Haratia Muir Watt, Hospitality, Tolerance, and Exclusion in
Legal Form: Private International Law and the Politics of Difference, 70 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 111,
111−47 (2017).
38. See Ralf Michaels, Post-Critical Private International Law: From Politics to Technique, in
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 54−67 (Diego Fernández Arroyo & Horatia
Muir Watts eds., 2014).
39. NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL
LAW (2010); Hans Lindahl, The Opening: Alegality and Political Agonism, in LAW AND AGONISTIC
POLITICS 57 (Andrew Schaap ed., 2008).
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legal and illegal and thereby, through its demand for a response, enables a
change.
Private international law suggests a different response to such a
challenge, namely that of technique. Technique enables the law to reduce a
conflict to its concrete aspects, and thereby to make it soluble. It does not
resort to a change of its own distinction between legal and illegal. Instead, it
resorts to a reconsideration of its own distinction between itself and the other,
between lex fori and lex causae.
But does not technicity mean that the underlying politics are ignored,
pretended to be nonexistent? This widespread critique represents the second
mistake in the critique of private international law. Private international law
as technique is not an alternative to a political understanding of conflicts;
instead, it becomes the language with which these political conflicts are not
only expressed but also made soluble, if only for the concrete case, and if
only in an always preliminary, incomplete manner.40 Private international
law does not deny the political, and ultimately insoluble, nature of the
conflicts it deals with. (An insolubility, Lindahl would add, that emerges
from the absence of an overarching legal order that brings together the Self
and the Other.) But private international law operates in an ‘as if’ mode—it
operates as if the politics could be ignored, as if insoluble conflicts were
soluble.41 This is a fiction. And a fiction is not the denial of reality—the
fiction is a tool formulated in full awareness of its incompatibility with
reality, a tool in order to reach results despite that reality.
V. GENERALIZING LINDAHL: A SYMMETRY OF ASYMMETRIES
On this basis, I suggest private international law cannot only be
fruitfully integrated into Lindahl’s theory. Moreover, private international
law enables us to generalize his theory, and therefore to move beyond where
he stands.
Recall, first, Lindahl’s dual asymmetry, in which an outside challenge
is prior to the response of the collective, and in which the collective’s
response prioritizes the inside over the outside. I find this argument to be
entirely convincing, as far as it goes.42 But note that underlying this dual
40. Michaels, supra note 38, at 63−67.
41. Knop, Michaels & Riles, supra note 21, at 638−40.
42. I think there is a different way of presenting this idea in which legal orders necessarily exclude:
because they are made of a number of individuals (a collective we), there will always be an individual
who disagrees with collective decisions. Within the legal order, there are two actions that this individual
can draw from her disagreement: she can put up, or she can shut up; she can try to make the collective
adapt to her own preferences, or she can adapt her own actions to the preferences of the collective. But
although these two actions—voice and loyalty—are the only two actions that are available within the
legal order, they are not the only possible responses to disagreement that exists altogether. See ALBERT
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asymmetry is a third asymmetry: an epistemological asymmetry. On its face,
Lindahl assigns positions of agency to both the KRRS and the WTO: the
KRRS puts out a demand (asymmetry 1), the WTO responds (asymmetry 2).
The perspective, however, is almost throughout that not of the KRRS but
from that of the WTO. Thus, the demand for recognition matters only insofar
as it is registered by the WTO. And the response by the WTO matters only
insofar as it affects the WTO itself: its impact on the KRRS is of only
secondary value. Or, put differently: it is of importance only insofar as the
WTO, from its inside perspective, deems it important.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong about a particular epistemological
perspective. It is a great quality of Lindahl’s theory that it avoids, mostly, a
universalist position from which conflicts are assessed, given that such a
position does not exist (except of course in the mind of the theorist who
describes this conflict from his meta-position). But what is mostly missing
from his account of pluralism is a pluralization of these epistemological
positions. The conflict between WTO and KRRS is a conflict between an
inside and an outside not only from the perspective from the WTO, but also,
importantly, from the position of the KRRS. Notably, from that latter
position, inside and outside reverse course. Now the WTO is the outsider
demanding recognition (prior to the response of the KRRS, asymmetry 1),
and the KRRS gets to respond on its own terms and by prioritizing itself over
the WTO (asymmetry 2).
O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
STATES (1970).
A third possible action is exit—the decision to no longer take part in the collective endeavor
altogether. This creates a conundrum. If exit is possible, the legal order is not inclusive: it does not include
the person who exited. But if exit is impossible, the legal order is not inclusive either: now it excludes
exit, and exit is outside of it.
It is characteristic of processes of contestation that they do not have a clear place between inside
and outside, between contestation within the legal order and contestation of the legal order itself. NeoNazis will sometimes invoke the Constitution in their favor, and sometimes contest the constitutional
order as illegitimate. When German Neo-Nazis say they want to fight for a “different Germany,” this can
mean that they want to change Germany, but it can also mean that they want to replace it. When Martin
Luther challenged the Pope, his interest was at first in reform of the Church—indeed, his argument was
that the Church had to return to the point, to use Lindahl’s terminology, that had originally defined its
endeavor. When that did not happen, however, he left the Church—inside contestation turned into outside
contestation. From the perspective of the contester, voice and exit are different strategies, not different
ontological positions.
I think Lindahl should be sympathetic to this ambivalence in no small part because it goes well
with his own interest in dynamics and change. His example of a-legality in his earlier book demonstrates
such a shift: the protesters are at first in violation of existing law, but then they manage to change that
law. A-legality is situated on an ambivalent place between inside and outside the legal order. When the
KRR contests the WTO, is this internal or external contestation? Is the KRR within the WTO, trying to
change its rules and strategies for a more inclusive policy? Or is it outside of the WTO, trying to fend off
claims by the WTO for comprehensive regulation?
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This has an impact also on the issue of boundaries. Lindahl is correct
that the WTO is in charge of drawing its own borders, and thereby defines
what is inside and what is outside. “[B]oundaries do more than include and
exclude; they include what they exclude and they exclude what they
include.”43 But a border not only has two sides—inside and outside; it is also
viewed from two perspectives. And what Lindahl neglects is that the
boundary between WTO and KRRS as drawn by the WTO is not the
boundary between WTO and KRRS as drawn by KRRS. In a world of plural
legal systems, KRRS, just like the WTO, also is in charge of drawing its own
borders, and thereby defines what is inside and what is outside. The border
between WTO and KRRS is not one border but two. And, importantly, these
two borders—the one drawn by the WTO and the one drawn by the KRRS—
need not match each other: there may be overlaps between the space that
each of them claims, or there may be gaps that are indifferent to both of them.
The result is what I want to call a symmetry of asymmetries. It is not a
situation of universalism: the respective boundary-drawing is not resolved
on some higher level. Nor is it a situation of reciprocal recognition: each
legal order remains free to determine how to respond to the other’s demand
(asymmetry 2). Although a legal order may hope that its own recognition
will cause the other to respond in kind, such a response is not automatic.
Reciprocity occasionally exists: for example, some countries recognize the
court decisions of a foreign sovereign only if and to the extent that foreign
sovereign recognizes their own countries. But such a reciprocity then
remains the choice of each legal system. And indeed, it sometimes fails.
When Californian courts began to recognize German court decisions in the
hope that Germany, under its own reciprocity regime, would in turn
recognize Californian court decisions, the German courts remained stubborn
and refused such recognition.44
A symmetry of asymmetries means that the dual asymmetry between
inside and outside from the perspective of the WTO is mirrored by the dual
asymmetry between inside and outside from the perspective of the KRRS. It
is not resolved in a universalist way. Neither legal order has normative force
over the other; neither can decide about the dual border with binding force
for both of them. At best, what can take place is a mutual arrangement, in
which legal orders align their respective borders to the borders drawn by the
other side, to minimize situations of overlap and of gaps. Such arrangements
are necessarily unstable, given that no universalist position exists to unite the
two sides, and given that each side’s asymmetric take may incentivize it to

43. LINDAHL, supra note 2, at 230.
44. See John Coyle, Rethinking Judgments Reciprocity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1109 (2014).
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draw the boundary more according to its own preferences than those of the
other side (asymmetry 2). In this sense, arrangements should be unlikely, and
indeed, for outside observers they often are. The question is not why we see
conflict at all—this is a consequence of asymmetries—but rather why we do
not see more conflict? Why is it possible for legal orders to arrange their
relations with each other in many situations, despite each side’s preference
for itself?
The answer, I suggest, lies in the technicalization of the way in which
such conflicts are administered. The technicity of private international law,
its ability to formulate conflicts as concrete and situation-focused, and as
technical as if they were not political, makes such arrangements possible.
Take the example of the relations between East and West Germany. This was
a situation of asymmetric recognition: East Germany recognized West
Germany as a separate state (and demanded to be recognized as such),
whereas West Germany refused to recognize East Germany. Now, in many
ways, this conflict was insoluble without the defeat of one side (as indeed
ultimately happened, effectively, with the breakdown in 1989). Until then,
however the ultimate conflict could be deferred through a complex
technique. Ingenious scholarship made it possible for lawyers on both sides
to bracket this overarching conflict and instead focus on concrete questions
emerging from the separation. These questions were conceptualized
differently from both sides. But this difference in conceptualization did not
stand in the way of resolving the concrete problems that emerged.
This technique is an important addition to Lindahl’s focus on agonistic
politics of a-legality. Legal orders can respond to demands for recognition
through renewed self-assertion: they can accept or reject the demand and
therefore change their own distinctions between legal and illegal or not. The
WTO, in Lindahl’s example, can accept and include the alternative norms
proposed by the KRRS, or not. But such changes are only one possible
response. They are costly—they require a change of the internal laws. And
they are problematic—they do not take the foreign law seriously on its own
terms. By deciding whether to accept or reject the foreign demand, a legal
order remains focused on itself in a solipsistic way: the other is relevant only
insofar as it matters for the self.
The technique of private international law enables an additional
dynamic between the self and the other: that of providing space for the other
as other. The WTO, for example, can assign a space for the KRRS (an
exception) in which it holds the KRRS rules applicable. This makes it
possible for the WTO to maintain its own rules, and yet at the same time to
accept the rules of the KRRS, in so far as they go. By doing so, a legal order

MICHAELS(DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

4/22/2019 6:40 PM

A SYMMETRY OF ASYMMETRIES?

421

manages to respond to the foreign demand for recognition without changing
its own distinction between legal and illegal.
VI. EPILOGUE: THE ASYMMETRY OF POWER
I have suggested that a private international law reconstruction of
Lindahl’s theory yields three benefits towards a generalization of that theory:
it provides for a fuller account of the relation between the collective and the
other (the application of foreign law), it allows for a multitude of
perspectives (the symmetry of asymmetries), and it creates a case in favor of
more, not less, technicality—not to avoid politics, but to the contrary to
enable political conflict to not stall the possibility of resolution, at least of
particular and concrete conflicts.
This is not a perfect solution, however. That it cannot convince the
universalist should be obvious: its solutions are always preliminary, always
partial, always context-specific, always asymmetric. But it must also leave
the committed pluralist unsatisfied. The reason is that the solution fails to
address a further asymmetry, one that I want to call asymmetry 4: the
asymmetry of power. I mentioned earlier that Lindahl does not appear
particularly concerned with the asymmetry of power that exists between the
WTO on the one hand and the KRRS on the other. Maybe, his theoreticalanalytical perspective can seem to make this focus dispensable. But I suspect
that the asymmetry creeps back into his perspective: the asymmetry of power
is the likely reason why Lindahl mostly assumes, for his argument, the
position of the WTO and not that of the KRRS. And indeed, the asymmetry
of power has important theoretical implications. In an abstract way, the
KRRS has as much discretion about whether to recognize the WTO, as the
WTO has discretion about whether to recognize the KRRS. In the concrete
reality, of course, this is very different. The discretion of the KRRS is,
effectively, severely hampered. The KRRS can, of course, try to generate a
global outrage in order to put pressure on the WTO; it can build networks
with likeminded other small groups and thereby enhance its power and
reduce the power imbalance. As long as the power imbalance exists,
however, such steps will always be partial. To the extent that the WTO
prioritizes itself over the KRRS, it will prevail over the KRRS due to this
power imbalance, because the WTO prioritization of itself is more powerful
than the KRRS prioritization of itself.
It is not clear that this power imbalance can be overcome in a world that
is, as Lindahl powerfully demonstrates, necessarily pluralistic. Any ethically
defensible responses to this power imbalance must come from within legal
orders, especially the powerful ones. The more powerful a legal order is, the
stronger the ethical claim on it to take into account its negative impact on its
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outside, its risk of hegemony. This remains a problem for Lindahl and private
international law alike. Maybe they can try to solve it together.

